You’ve no doubt read about Google’s driverless car and the effort at the state level to gain permission for its use on public roads. Continue reading
#17 – WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF SELF DRIVING VEHICLES? – PAUL KOSTEK
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Category Archives: Design@Risk™
#13 – HOW TO AVOID HUMAN ERROR IN DESIGN – BEN MARGUGLIO
Any enterprise that is engaged in activities with the potential for public and employee harm should be encouraged, if not required to develop and implement an integrated risk management, safety management, quality management and environmental manage system for the prevention of events with intolerable effects. Such a management system would establish various techniques by which to analyze the safety and quality of the designs of hardware and processes. Let’s look at a few design tools. Continue reading
#10 – ALARP – AS LOW AS REASONABLY POSSIBLE – PAUL KOSTEK
ALARP – As Low as Reasonably Possible.
For anyone with any experience with risk management this is one of the key terms used to make a decision about applying risk mitigations. It is used when going beyond a certain point (cost/weight/performance), open to definition by every company, that the resulting cost/performance of the product no longer makes fiscal sense.
#8: UNADDRESSED RISK – PAUL KOSTEK
What’s the risk of not addressing a risk? What happens on a project when a risk is identified and not addressed/mitigated? There may be reasons not to correct it, e.g low probability of occurrence and minimal impact, but how do we document and track this decision? And if we’re delaying an implementation how do we insure the risk is addressed at a later date, e.g. next version release? How do we insure that if an audit takes place the project team can clearly explain the reasons for the decision? Is this even acceptable?
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#7 – SOFTWARE RISK MANAGEMENT – PAUL KOSTEK
For anyone involved in risk management the thought of applying risk techniques to software opens many questions, including can we really identify risk areas in code? Can we identify what software items contribute to hazardous situations? Can we identify mitigations and be sure we have covered all cases?